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Organizational Form and Efficiency:
1
An Analysis of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability Insurers
May 30, 1998
Abstract : This paper analyzes the efficiency of stock and mutual organizational forms in
the property-liability insurance industry using nonparametric frontier efficiency methods.
We test the managerial discretion hypothesis, which predicts that the market will sort
organizational forms into market segments where they have comparative advantages in
minimizing the costs of production, including agency costs. Both production and cost
frontiers are estimated. The results indicate that stocks and mutuals are operating on
separate production and cost frontiers and thus represent distinct technologies. The stock
technology dominates the mutual technology for producing stock output vectors and the
mutual technology dominates the stock technology for producing mutual output vectors.
However, the stock cost frontier dominates the mutual cost frontier for the majority of both
stock and mutual firms. Thus, the mutuals’ technological advantage is eroded because they
are less successful than stocks in choosing cost-minimizing combinations of inputs. The
finding of separate frontiers and organization specific technological advantages is consistent
with the managerial discretion hypothesis, but we also find evidence that stocks are more
successful than mutuals in minimizing costs.With costly contracting, agency costs are generated by incentive conflicts among parties to a
1
contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency costs are defined as all costs incurred in attempting to control
agency conflicts as well as the residual costs that remain because the costs of full enforcement of the contract
exceed the benefits.
Stocks and mutuals together account for about 93 percent of property-liability insurance premium
2
revenues.  The other two organizational forms in the industry are reciprocals, which are somewhat similar to
mutuals, and Lloyds associations, where the ownership and management functions are merged.  See Mayers
and Smith (1986).
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND EFFICIENCY:
AN ANALYSIS OF STOCK AND MUTUAL PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURERS
1.  Introduction
In the modern theory of the firm, agency costs provide an explanation for the structure of organizations,
with the organizations that survive in any economic activity being the ones that deliver the desired product at
the lowest possible price while covering agency costs and the costs of production (e.g., Jensen and Meckling,
1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b).   The insurance industry provides an interesting environment for
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studying the agency theoretic hypotheses because different organizational forms coexist in the industry.  This
paper focuses on the two most important organizational forms in the property-liability insurance industry --
stock insurers, which are owned by shareholders, and mutual insurers, which are owned by policyholders.   The
2
objective is to test hypotheses regarding the relative efficiency of the stock and mutual organizational forms
using nonparametric frontier efficiency methods.
Agency theory arguments have led to the development of several hypotheses about the stock and
mutual organizational forms. These stem from the observation that the two organizational forms have
comparative advantages in dealing with different types of agency costs.  The stock ownership form provides
more effective mechanisms for controlling owner-manager conflicts than the mutual ownership form.  Stock
firms have alienable ownership claims, giving rise to control mechanisms such as proxy fights, hostile
takeovers, and executive stock option plans that can be used to reduce opportunistic behavior of managers.
Because mutuals do not have alienable ownership claims, the control mechanisms available to mutual owners
are much weaker.  On the other hand, the owner-policyholder conflict is likely to be relatively high in the stock
ownership form because stockholders have an incentive to expropriate value from policyholders by taking2
Evidence consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis has been provided in numerous
3
papers (see, for example, Mayers and Smith, 1988, 1992).  
Mutual insurers thus should be relatively successful in lines of business with relatively good
4
actuarial tables and lines where underwriting procedures and reinsurance decisions are relatively
uncomplicated.   In general, mutuals also should engage in fewer lines of business and operate over narrower
geographical areas than stock insurers, because the costs of monitoring and controlling management varies
directly with the scope of an insurer's operations.  
actions such as delaying claim payments and changing the risk-characteristics of the firm after policies have
been issued.  Mutuals deal effectively with the owner-policyholder conflict by merging the ownership and
policyholder functions.
Perhaps the most influential agency theoretic hypothesis about stocks and mutuals is the managerial
discretion hypothesis (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1986, 1988). According to this hypothesis, the degree
of managerial discretion required to operate in a given line of insurance is the primary determinant of the
organizational form likely to succeed in that line.  The hypothesis predicts that the stock ownership form will
be dominant in lines of insurance where managers must be given a relatively large amount of discretion in
pricing and underwriting, such as  such as commercial coverages on national or multi-national firms, and in
operating over wider geographical areas.  The stock form of ownership is likely to have a comparative
advantage in these types of operations because of its superior mechanisms for owners to control managers.
3
Mutuals, on the other hand, are likely to be more successful in lines that require less managerial discretion such
as personal lines, where the need for individualized pricing and underwriting is relatively low.  Where
managerial discretion is limited, the elimination of the owner-policyholder conflict is likely to give mutuals a
comparative advantage over stocks.   The same reasoning leads to the prediction that mutuals are likely to be
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relatively successful in lines such as liability insurance, where claims settlement may occur several years after
the policy is issued, because the longer time horizon gives managers more opportunity to exploit policyholder
interests. This is known as the maturity hypothesis.  
Because the available mechanisms for controlling owner-manager conflicts in the mutual ownership3
form are relatively weak, the costs of managerial opportunism in the mutual ownership form are expected to
be higher than in the stock ownership form.  One potentially important type of managerial opportunism is
"expense preference" behavior, where managers generate unnecessary costs through the consumption of
perquisites (e.g., Williamson, 1963).  According to the expense preference hypothesis, mutuals are expected
to be less successful than stocks in minimizing costs because of higher perquisite consumption.
It is important to point out that these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; e.g., it would be possible
for mutuals to be more successful in low managerial discretion or longer-maturity lines of insurance, even
though mutual managers exhibit expense preference behavior.  This outcome would imply that the perquisite
consumption is not sufficient to offset the mutual advantage in eliminating the policyholder-owner conflict.
   The managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses predict that firms with different organizational
forms will be sorted into market segments where they have comparative advantages in minimizing production
and agency costs.  According to this hypothesis, one would not necessarily observe differences in efficiency
among organizational forms after controlling for production technology and business mix.  The expense
preference hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that mutual firms will have higher costs than stock firms after
controlling for business mix and other factors.
The purpose of this paper is to test these agency theoretic hypotheses by using frontier efficiency
methodologies to compare the efficiency of stock and mutual property-liability insurers.   Our analysis is based
on non-parametric, “best practice” production and cost frontiers estimated for a sample of 211 mutual and 206
stock  insurance companies over the period 1981-1990.  We use data envelopment analysis (DEA) (see
Charnes, et al., 1994) to estimate production and cost frontiers and Malmquist indices (e.g., Grosskopf, 1993)
to measure the evolution of productivity and efficiency over time.
The fundamental idea behind our hypothesis tests is that the stock and mutual organizational forms
represent different technologies for producing insurance, where technology is defined as including all of the
contractual relationships that constitute the firm as well as physical technology choices.  Thus, if the managerial
discretion and maturity hypotheses are correct, stocks and mutuals should be operating with  different4
An additional advantage of the mutual ownership form, which we cannot test for our sample period,
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is that mutuals are less likely to respond to infrequent regulatory and other changes in a way that transfers
wealth between owners and managers.  E.g., Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) find that stocks changed their
asset structure significantly to take more risk in response to the adoption of insurance guaranty funds,
whereas the response of mutuals was much less pronounced.  Thus, mutuals have some advantages in dealing
with unusual events that are not measured in our analysis.
production and cost frontiers.  Furthermore, the stock technology should dominate the mutual technology for
producing stock output vectors; and the mutual technology should dominate the stock technology for producing
mutual output vectors.  If the expense preference hypothesis is correct, mutuals are expected to be less
successful than stocks in minimizing costs.  
5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The hypotheses, empirical predictions, and
methodology are discussed in section 2.  Section 3 discusses input and output measurement and sample
section. The results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2.  Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section, we briefly review the relevant prior efficiency literature on the insurance industry.  We
then discuss our hypotheses and methodology.
Prior Literature
In spite of the level of interest in organizational form in insurance, the literature on the efficiency of
stock and mutual insurers is surprisingly sparse.   The principal papers to deal directly with this issue using
modern frontier efficiency methods are Fecher, et al. (1993), Gardner and Grace (1993), and Fukuyama
(1997).  Gardner and Grace (1993) analyze U.S. life insurers and conclude that efficiencies do not differ by
organizational form; and Fecher, et al. (1993) arrive at a similar conclusion for the French insurance industry.
The study most similar to ours in terms of methodology is Fukuyama (1997).  Using DEA and the Malmquist
approach, he finds that Japanese stock and mutual life insurers are operating on different production frontiers.
Our analysis extends the prior literature by providing the first frontier efficiency analysis of  alternative
organizational forms in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry.  Our study extends Fecher, et al.  (1993)
and Fukuyama (1997) by analyzing cost efficiency as well as technical efficiency, measuring the efficiency of5
Previous applications of non-parametric efficiency analysis to non-insurance financial institutions
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include Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992), who conclude that minority-owned banks and non-minority-owned
banks have different production technologies.  
stocks and mutuals relative to the other group’s production and cost frontiers (cross-frontier analysis), and
explicitly testing the managerial discretion and expense preference hypotheses.
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Hypothesis Test Procedures   
As mentioned above, the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses predict that stocks and
mutuals represent different technologies for producing insurance and, therefore, that stocks and mutuals are
expected to operate on different frontiers.  Furthermore, if these hypotheses are correct, then the stock and
mutual technologies should be respectively superior in producing stock and mutual output vectors.  The
expense preference hypothesis predicts that mutuals will be less successful than stocks in minimizing costs.
We test the hypotheses by estimating “best practice” production and cost frontiers.  The production frontier
represents the minimum quantity of inputs needed to produce a given output vector; while the cost frontier
represents the minimum costs required to produce a given output vector, conditional on input prices.
  We first test the null hypothesis that stock and mutual insurers are operating on the same frontier
against the alternative hypothesis that they operate on different frontiers.  Rejection of the null hypothesis in
this case would be consistent with the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses in that it supports the
view that the two groups of firms are using different technologies.  The rejection of the null hypothesis on this
set of tests also would carry the implication that a comparison of efficiencies based on the pooled frontier is
not informative because the two groups of firms are operating on separate frontiers.  Because this null
hypothesis is rejected (see below), we do not present a separate analysis of the pooled frontier. 
To provide more direct information on the hypothesis that firms are sorted into groups with
comparative efficiency advantages, we conduct a second set of tests.  In this set the null hypothesis is that each
group's output vector could be produced with equal efficiency using the other group's production technology.
This involves computing the efficiency of the firms in each group with reference to the other group's6
The Farrell cost efficiency analysis conducted here decomposes cost efficiency (i.e., the ratio of the
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minimum costs the firm could have realized by operating on the efficient cost frontier to the actual costs
incurred) into technical efficiency, a measure of the distance of the firm from the efficient production frontier
reflecting the most efficient technology, and allocative efficiency, a measure of the firm’s success in choosing
the cost-minimizing combination of inputs, conditional on its choice of technology.
This type of outcome would require some limitation on competition within the mutual segment of
8
the industry that permits the survival of inefficient firms, at least for some period of time. Evidence of
maintained differences in efficiency over time in insurance and banking are provided by Cummins and Weiss
(1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1991, 1992). 
production or cost frontier.  Rejection of this null hypothesis for both groups would imply that stocks and
mutuals have developed dominant technologies for producing their respective output vectors.  This would
provide evidence in favor of our efficiency-based interpretation of the managerial discretion and maturity
hypotheses. This set of tests permits us to provide evidence on which frontier is dominant for each observation
in the sample by measuring the distance between the stock and mutual frontiers for each firm’s vector of inputs
and outputs.
Measuring both production and cost frontiers provides evidence on the expense preference hypothesis
by separating the effect on costs of the choice of production technology from the choice of input mix,
conditional on the technology.   Even if stocks and mutuals are sorted into market segments where they have
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technological advantages, such advantages could be eroded if firms fail to choose cost- minimizing
combinations of inputs, an outcome that has been interpreted as evidence of expense preference behavior
(Mester, 1991).  Expense preferencing could coexist with the sorting  of firms into efficient groups based on
technology.  For example, mutual managers could consume higher costs up to the point where the mutuals’
cost advantage over stocks due to their superior technology is nearly eliminated.  
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The third part of our analysis, which looks at the evolution of efficiency and productivity over time,
also sheds light on the expense preference hypotheses.  The use of Malmquist indices permits us to separate
the evolution of productivity into technical efficiency change and technical change.  We analyze this evolution
separately for the stock and mutual segments of the industry.  If mutual managers have less incentive to
operate efficiently, the inter-temporal performance of mutuals is likely to be inferior to that of stocks withD(y, x) ’ sup{ 2: (y, x
2
) 0 V(y) }
’ ( inf{ 2: (y, 2x) 0 V(y) } )&1
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          (1)
regard to either technical efficiency change or technical change. 
Methodology
In this section, we provide an overview of our method for estimating  production and cost frontiers and
then discuss the linear programming problems that are solved to estimate efficiency and the Malmquist indices.
Distance Functions and Efficiency.  To analyze production frontiers, we employ the input-oriented
distance function introduced by Shephard (1970).  Suppose producers use input vector x = ( x , x ,... x  )  0 1 2 k
T
œ   to produce output vector y = ( y , y , ..y  )  0 œ , where T denotes the vector transpose.  A production + 1 2 n +
k T n
technology which transforms inputs into outputs can be modeled by an input correspondence  y 6 V(y) f œ . +
k
For any  y  0 œ , V(y) denotes the subset of all input vectors x  0  œ  which yield at least y.  V(y) is assumed + +
n k
to satisfy certain axioms (see Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, 1985, and Färe, 1988).  The input oriented distance
function for a specific decision making unit (DMU) is defined by
The input distance function is the same as the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional contraction of the
input vector x, given outputs y, i.e., Farrell's measure of input technical efficiency T(y,x), where T(y,x) =
1/D(y,x). The quantity D(y,x) must be $ 1, and T(y,x) is # 1. 
Distance functions can be estimated with respect to frontiers characterized by constant returns to scale
(CRS), variable returns to scale (VRS), and non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS).  In this paper, we work
exclusively with CRS frontiers.  This is the approach used most commonly in the literature because  it
represents the optimal outcome from an economic perspective, i.e., with CRS, firms are not consuming
unnecessary resources because they are too large or too small (Aly, et al., 1990).  The CRS approach measures
departures from optimal scale as inefficiency.
We can also define a minimum cost function or cost frontier using the distance function approach 
(Farë, 1988, Lovell, 1993).  Let w = (w , w , . . . , w )  denote the input price vector corresponding to the 1 2 K
Tc y w w x D y x
x
T ( , ) min{ : ( , ) } = ‡1
D t%1(y t, x t) ’ sup{ 2: (y t, x t
2
) 0 V(y t%1) }
D t(y t%1, x t%1) ’ sup{ 2: (y t%1, x t%1
2
) 0 V(y t) }
M t ’ D t(y t, x t)
D t(yt%1, x t%1)
or M t%1 ’ D t%1(y t, x t)






input vector x.  Then the cost frontier is defined as:  
where c(y,w) = the cost frontier.  The optimal input vector x  minimizes the costs of producing y given the input
*
prices w.  Cost efficiency is calculated as the ratio 0 = w x /w x, where x represents actual input usage.  The
T * T
measure of cost efficiency, 0 < 0 # 1,  is interpreted as the proportion by which the firm could multiply its cost
vector and still produce no less of any output.  
The Malmquist index approach is used to measure technical efficiency change and technical change.
Technical efficiency refers to the reciprocal of the distance from the production frontier and technical change
refers to movements in the frontier over time.  To define the Malmquist index for the production frontier, we
modify equation (1) to incorporate time  and define input distance functions with respect to two different time
periods, as follows:
In equation (3), the input-output bundle in time period t+1 is evaluated relative to the technology of time period
t; while in equation (4) the input-output bundle observed in period t is evaluated relative to the  technology of
time t+1.  Malmquist productivity indices can be defined relative to either the technology in period t or the
technology in period t+1, as follows:
where M measures productivity growth between periods t and t+1 using the technology in period t as the
tM(y t%1, x t%1, y t, x t) ’ [( D t(y t, x t)
D t(y t%1, x t%1)
) ( D t%1(y t, x t)
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reference technology, while M  measures productivity growth with respect to the technology in period t+1.
t+1
To avoid an arbitrary choice of reference technology, the input-oriented Malmquist productivity index is
defined as the geometric mean of M and M :
t t+1
This productivity index can be decomposed into measures of technical efficiency change and technical change,
by factoring as follows:
The first ratio in equation (7), in parentheses, represents technical efficiency change, i.e., the relative
distance of the input-output bundle from the frontier in periods t and t+1.  Recall that both the numerator and
denominator of the ratio must be $ 1 and that values closer to 1 represent higher efficiency.  Thus, if technical
efficiency is higher in period t+1 than in period t, the value of this ratio will be > 1; while if efficiency declines
between the two periods, the value of the ratio will be < 1. 
The second factor in equation (7) is a geometric mean, representing technical change (shifts in the
frontier) between periods t and t+1.  If technical improvement occurs, the frontier will shift in a favorable
direction, and both ratios comprising the geometric mean will exceed 1.  Thus, values of the second factor >
1 imply technical progress and values < 1 imply technical regress.  
To test the hypotheses investigated in this study, we need to estimate distance functions for stock and
mutual insurers with respect to several different reference sets.  In the following discussion, subscripts on D
indicate the reference set of firms used to construct the frontier.  E.g., D (y ,x ) denotes the input distance s s  s
function for stock firm s, measured with respect to a reference frontier consisting only of stock firms, where
s = 1, 2, . . ., S, and S = the total number of stock firms in the sample.  Likewise, D (y ,x ) represents the input m m mDm(ys, xs) ’ sup{ 2: (ys,
xs
2
) 0 V(ym) } , s ’ 1,2,...,S
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(8)
distance function for mutuals, where m = 1, 2, . . ., M, and M = the number of mutual firms.  The pooled
frontier with respect to the reference set consisting of all stock and mutual firms is denoted D (y,x), i = 1, 2, p i i
. . . , M+S. 
We also use a method originating from the Malmquist index approach, which involves computing
distances of mutuals from the stock frontier and distances of stocks from the mutual frontier, i.e., each group
of firms is used as the reference set for the other group.  This method requires the estimation of cross-frontier
distance functions: 
I.e., D (y ,x ) is the input distance function for stock firm s relative to mutual frontier.  The input distance m s s
function for mutual firm m relative to the stock frontier, D (y ,x ) is defined similarly.   This enables us to s m m
measure the efficiency of the firms with a particular organizational form relative to a best practice frontier
based on the alternative organizational form.   
Whereas the distance function values for firms relative to their own group must be $ 1, the distances
relative to the other group's frontier can be >, =, or < 1.  This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows isoquants
for two hypothetical firms producing a single output with two inputs.  The isoquant for stocks is labeled L (y),
S
and the isoquant for mutuals is labeled L (y).  The isoquants represent the best technology for the respective
M
groups of firms, i.e., firms operating on the isoquants are on the production frontier and thus are fully efficient
(T(y,x) = 1).  To illustrate the group-specific frontiers, consider stock firm s, which operates at point b.  This
firm could reduce its input usage by moving to the frontier and operating at point a.  Its distance function value
is D (y ,x ) = 0b/0a > 1. Likewise, the input distance function value for mutual firm m, operating at point e, s s  s
is D (y ,x ) = 0e/0d > 1.   m m m
The stock and mutual isoquants in Figure 1 have been drawn so that they intersect.  This means that
neither technology dominates the other for all combinations of inputs.  The distance of the stock firm from the







Because we are interested primarily in the sign of F(x,y), the conclusions would be the same if we
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i i
normalized the frontier distance to the input quantity needed to produce y under the mutual technology. i
(8)
0e/0f < 1, i.e., each firm is using an input vector that is dominant for its technology. If the isoquants do not
intersect, e.g., if the stock-firm isoquant is to the left of the mutual-firm isoquant for all input combinations,
then the stock technology is dominant for producing output level y.  In this case,  the D (y ,x ) are always s m m
greater than 1.
Since technical efficiencies are obtained as reciprocals of input distance functions, these results imply
that the group-specific efficiencies must be # 1, i.e., a firm cannot do better than to operate on the frontier, but
the cross-frontier efficiencies can be less than, equal to, or greater than 1.  A cross-frontier efficiency greater
than 1 means that a firm’s input-output bundle is infeasible using the other group’s technology.  In terms of
Figure 1, the output-input combination (y ,x ) is infeasible using the mutual technology and the output-input s s
combination (y ,x ) is infeasible using the stock technology.   m m
Under the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses, one would expect to observe stock (mutual)
firms  operating in the region where stock (mutual) technology dominates.  To measure dominance with respect
to the production frontiers, we compute the distance between the frontiers for each firm in the sample.  For
example, for mutual firms we define the distance as:
For the mutual firm portrayed in Figure 1, F(y ,x ) = 1-0d/0f = (0f-0d)/0f, which provides a measure of the m m
distance between the frontiers expressed as a ratio to the quantity of inputs required to produce the firm’s
output vector under the stock technology.   Likewise, for the stock firm in Figure 1, F(y ,x ) = (0a-0c)/0c.  A
9
s s
value of F(y,x) < 0 implies that the stock technology is dominant for input-output vector (y,x), while a value i i i i
of  F(y,x) > 0 implies that the mutual technology is dominant for this input-output vector.  i i
We define a similar dominance measure based on cost efficiency:Fc(ym, xm) ’ 1 &
Cm(ym, xm)
Cs(ym, xm)
( Dp(yi, xi) )&1 ’ Tp(yi, xi )
’ min 2i
subject to: Yp 8i $ yi




          (10)
where F (y ,x ) = a scaled measure of the mutual firm’s efficiency relative to the stock cost frontier minus its c m m
efficiency relative to the mutual cost frontier.  If  F (y,x) < 0, the stock frontier is dominant for input-output c i i
bundle (y,x); and if  F (y,x) > 0, the mutual frontier is dominant for input-output bundle (y,x).  Intuitively, i i c i i i i
if the mutual firm, for example, has higher efficiency with respect to its own frontier than it does with respect
to the stock frontier, it would have to improve more to become fully efficient relative to the stock frontier, and
thus a stock firm producing its output vector would be more efficient.
Estimating Efficiency Using DEA.  DEA efficiency is estimated by solving linear programming
problems.  For example, the technical efficiency with respect to the pooled frontier is estimated by solving the
following problem, for each firm,  i = 1,2,... S+M, in each year of the sample period (time superscripts are
suppressed):
where Y  is an N x (S+M) output matrix and X  an K x (S+M) input matrix for all firms in the sample, y is p p i
a N x 1 output vector and x an K x 1 output vector for firm i, and 8 is an (S+M) x 1 intensity vector (the i i
inequalities are interpreted as applying to each row of the relevant matrix).  Efficiencies for the stock and
mutual samples, T(x,y) and T (x ,y ) are estimated similarly.  The constraint 8 $ 0 imposes constant returns s s s m m m i
to scale.








          (11)
(7)
solving the following linear programming model, for each stock firm,  s = 1,2,... S, and each time period:
subject to: Y  8  $ y  , m s s
X  8  # 2 x  , m s s s
      8  $ 0 , s
where Y  is an N x M output matrix and X  an K x M output matrix for all mutual firms, y is an N x 1 output m m s 
vector and x a K x 1 input vector of the stock firm s, and 8  an M x 1 intensity vector of mutuals with respect s s
to stock firm s.  The efficiency D (y ,x ) is estimated similarly. s m m
For technical efficiency, we estimate two input distance functions ( D  (x ,y  ) and D  (x ,y  ) ) for 206 s s s m s s
stock firms and two input distance functions ( D  (x ,y  ) and D  (x ,y  ) ) for 211 mutual firms. The pooled m m m s m m
distance function D (x ,y )  is also estimated to test our first null hypothesis.  p p p
A two-step procedure is used to estimate cost efficiency.  Using the pooled reference set as an example,
the first step is to solve the following problem:
subject to: Y  8 $ y , p i i
X  8 # x , p i i
      8 $ 0 . i
The solution vector x* is the cost-minimizing input vector for the input price vector w  and the output vector i i
y.   In the second step, we calculate firm i’s cost efficiency as the ratio 0 = w x*/w x . i i i i i i 
T T
The following problem is solved as the first step to obtain cross-frontier cost efficiencies of mutual







subject to:    Y 8  $ y , s m m
         X 8  # x s m m,
          
8  $ 0, m
where Y  and X  are output and input matrices for all stock firms and y  and x  are output and input s s m m
vectors for mutual firm m, m = 1, 2, . . ., m, and  8  is an intensity vector for stocks relative to the mutual m
firm.  The solution vector x * is the cost-minimizing input vector for mutual firm m with respect to the m
stock reference set.  The second step is to calculate cost efficiency 0  = w x */w x .  We estimate the m m m m m
T T
same number of the cost efficiency measures as technical efficiency measures.
3.  Outputs, Inputs, and Sample Selection
To estimate our input oriented distance and cost functions, we need estimates of outputs, inputs, and
input prices.  This section defines these variables and discusses the sample used to estimate the models.
Defining and Measuring Output. Consistent with most of the recent financial institutions literature
we adopt a modified version of the value-added approach to measure property-liability insurer outputs. The
value-added approach counts as important outputs those that have significant value added, as judged using
operating cost allocations (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992).
Property-liability insurers provide three principal services:
! Risk-pooling and risk-bearing.  Insurance provides a mechanism for consumers and businesses
exposed to property-liability losses to engage in risk reduction through pooling. The actuarial,
underwriting, and related expenses incurred in pooling are major components of value added in the
industry.  Insurers also add value by holding capital to bear the residual risk of the pool.
! "Real" financial services relating to insured losses.  Insurers provide a variety of real services for
policyholders including risk surveys, coverage design, loss prevention, and loss settlement services. By
contracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders can take advantage of insurers'
specialized expertise to reduce costs associated with insurable risks.15
The use of premiums would not be appropriate because premiums represent price times quantity of
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output, i.e., insurance revenues.
! Intermediation.  Insurers collect premiums in advance of loss payments and hold the funds in
reserves until claims are paid, similar to corporate debt.  Policyholders receive a discount in their
premiums to compensate for the opportunity cost of the funds held by the insurer. The borrowed funds
are invested primarily in marketable securities. 
In terms of operating costs, about 32% of total industry operating expenses are for loss settlement
services, the primary real service provided by the industry (A.M. Best Company, 1994). About 66% of
operating costs are accounted for by marketing and administrative costs.  Some of these costs are attributable
to real services but the majority, such as actuarial, underwriting, and administrative costs, are attributable to
the risk-pooling function. The remaining 2% of operating expenses are absorbed by the intermediation function.
A strict application of the value-added approach would identify risk pooling and real services as important
outputs and intermediation as an unimportant output.  However, in view of the amount of assets controlled by
insurers (about $705 billion in 1994) and the importance of investment income as a source of revenue for the
industry, we elected to retain the intermediation function in defining industry output.
Transactions flow data such as the number of applications processed, the number of policies issued,
the number of claims settled, etc. are not publicly available for insurers. However, a satisfactory proxy for the
amount of risk-pooling and real insurance services provided is the present value of real losses incurred (Berger,
Cummins, and Weiss, 1996).   Losses incurred are defined as the losses that are expected to be paid as the
10
result of providing insurance coverage during a particular period of time.  Because the objective of risk-pooling
is to collect funds from the policyholder pool and redistribute them to those who incur losses, proxying output
by the amount of losses incurred seems quite appropriate.  Losses are also a good proxy for the amount of real
services provided, since the amount of claims settlement and risk management services also are highly
correlated with loss aggregates.  
Because underwriting risk and service intensity vary by line of business, we disaggregate losses into
four categories: short-tail personal lines, short-tail commercial lines, long-tail personal lines, and long-tail16
The designations "long-tail" and "short-tail" refer to the length of the lag between the policy
11
inception and loss payment dates.  In short-tail lines (e.g., auto collision) the lag is usually less than two
years, while for long tail lines (e.g., commercial liability) losses may remain unpaid for 10 or 15 years. 
Payout patterns are estimated from data reported in Best's Aggregates and Averages (A.M. Best
12
Company, Oldwick, NJ, various years).  We estimate the payout proportions using the method prescribed by
the Internal Revenue Service for obtaining the present value of losses for tax purposes.  The discount rates
are based on the U.S. Treasury yield curves reported by Coleman, Fisher, and Ibbotson (1989), updated
through 1990 using data from other sources.  
The costs of physical capital (mainly rental expenses and computers) are small relative to the other
13
inputs.  Accordingly, physical capital is incorporated into the materials category.
commercial lines.   Because insurers report their losses incurred at undiscounted values, we discount the losses
11
to present value using estimated industry-wide payout patterns.   Losses are deflated to the base year 1982
12
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Our modeling of the intermediation function views insurers as raising funds by borrowing from
policyholders and then investing the funds in marketable securities.  The output of the intermediation function
is total invested assets, expressed in real 1982 dollars by deflating by the CPI.  
Defining and Measuring Inputs and Input Prices.  Insurance inputs can be classified into four
groups: labor, business services, debt capital (including policyholder funds), and equity capital.  Our labor costs
variable is the sum of salaries, employee benefits, payroll taxes, and miscellaneous employment-related costs.
The quantity of labor input is defined as labor costs divided by a salary deflator, which indexes average weekly
employee wages for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Class 6331, Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurers.
The salary deflator is interpreted as the price of labor input.  The business services category is dominated by
outside business services such as agents' commissions and loss adjustment expenses from lawyers and loss
adjustment firms.  Less important components of the materials category are travel, communications, and
printing.  The input price index for business services is calculated similarly to the labor price index using SIC
13
7399, Business Services. 
The debt capital of insurers consists primarily of funds borrowed from policyholders.  These funds are
measured in real terms as the sum of loss reserves and unearned premium reserves, deflated to the base year17
Expected investment income attributable to equity capital equals the expected rate of investment
14
return multiplied by average equity capital for the year.  This is based on the Myers and Cohn (1987)
argument that investors will not supply capital to an insurer unless they receive a market return equal to the
amount they could receive by investing in an asset portfolio that replicates the insurer's portfolio plus a risk
premium for costs arising due to committing capital to the insurance business.
Since net income tends to fluctuate due to the randomness of loss payments, we computed the
15
expected cost of capital as the predicted value of the ratio of adjusted net income to adjusted equity from a
pooled cross-section time-series regression of this variable on a vector of variables representing insurer
characteristics. Regressors include the proportions of bonds and stocks in the investment portfolio, the four
insurance outputs, a measure of insurance leverage (the premiums-to-surplus ratio), the intermediate-term
government bond yield, and year dummy variables.  The predicted value from the regression was used as the
cost of the equity capital input.  The net income measure used in the ratio was adjusted for prepaid expenses.
1982 using the CPI.  The interest payment made to policyholders for the use of policyholder-supplied debt
capital is implicit in the premium.  The cost of policyholder-supplied debt capital is estimated as the ratio of
total expected investment income minus expected investment income attributed to equity capital divided by
average policyholder-supplied debt capital.  
14
Equity capital is an input for the risk-pooling and risk-bearing function because it provides assurance
that the company will pay claims even if they are larger than expected.  Thus, the real value of equity capital
(deflated to 1982 by the CPI) is considered an input category.  The cost of equity capital is estimated as the
ratio of the insurer's expected net income to the average value of equity capital.   To summarize, we use four
15
inputs:  labor, materials, policyholder supplied debt capital, and equity capital.   
Sample Selection.  The primary source of data for this study are the regulatory annual statements filed
with state insurance commissioners as reported on the A.M. Best Company data tapes.  In order to estimate
the evolution of efficiency and technical change in the industry, we selected a complete panel of insurers with
data continuously available over the sample period, 1981-1990.  The decision making units (DMUs) in the
insurance industry consist of groups of affiliated insurers under common ownership and individual, unaffiliated
insurers. The sample consists of all groups and unaffiliated insurers for which meaningful data were available
over the entire sample period -- 206 stock insurers and 211 mutuals.  The insurers in the sample accounted for
90 percent of industry assets during our sample period, so our results may be considered as reasonably18
The test is discussed in Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992), and the results are available from the
16
authors.  
Although this would seem to suggest that stocks are defining the pooled frontier, in fact that does
17
not appear to be the case.  Although stocks appeared slightly more often in reference sets (344 times in the
ten years covered in the study) than mutuals (314 times), the difference is not statistically significant.  The
reference set is the group of firms that form the frontier for a specific insurer (the firms with non-zero 8 in i
the linear programming solution).
representative of the entire industry.  
Summary statistics on the variables used in estimating the models are presented in Table 1.  Stock firms
on average are larger than mutuals in terms of costs, input quantities, output quantities, and real invested assets.
Stocks also produce more commercial lines output than mutuals; commercial lines account for 53 percent of
insurance output for stock insurers but only 25 percent for mutuals. For mutuals, long-tail personal lines such
as private passenger auto liability represent 51 percent of their insurance outputs.  These patterns of business
mix are consistent with the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses.  Also consistent with the managerial
discretion hypothesis, stocks on average have lower geographical Herfindahl indices than mutuals, where the
indices are based on the proportions of net premiums written by state. 
4.  Results
Average Efficiencies  
Our first null hypothesis is that stocks and mutuals are operating on the same frontier, i.e., that a pooled
frontier can be used to analyze differences in efficiency between the two organizational forms.  The test
involves estimating the pooled frontier as well as the group-specific mutual and stock frontiers and  then testing
the hypothesis that the pooled and group-specific frontiers are identical.  Statistical tests overwhelmingly reject
the hypothesis that the mutual frontier is identical to the pooled frontier based on the input distance function
results.  The tests did not lead to rejection of the hypothesis that the stock frontier differs from the pooled
16
frontier.   Nevertheless, the strong rejection with respect to mutuals implies that  technical efficiency
17
comparisons should be based on separate mutual and stock frontiers.
The technical efficiency scores based on separate mutual and stock frontiers are shown in the columns19
Asterisks between pairs of columns give the results of significance tests for differences between the
18
results in the corresponding cells of the two columns.  Reported significance levels are based on analysis of
variance (ANOVA).  Non-parametric tests, including the Kruskal-Wallis, Van der Waerden, and Savage
tests, produced similar results.
headed T(y,x) and T (y ,x ) in Table 2.  Mutuals are significantly more efficient with respect to the mutual s s s m m m
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frontier, in comparison with the efficiency of stocks relative to the stock frontier, in every year of the sample
period; and the dispersions of the mutual efficiency scores within each year of the sample period are lower than
the dispersions of the stock scores.  The findings with respect to both average efficiencies and dispersions
would be consistent with stocks' operating in more complex and heterogeneous lines of business as predicted
by the managerial discretion hypothesis.  Efficiencies might be lower in complex lines because it is easier to
make mistakes in designing technologies for underwriting, pricing, and servicing complicated or individualized
insurance policies.  These results cannot be interpreted as implying that the output of stock insurers would be
produced more efficiently by mutuals, however, because the firms are using different technologies, reflected
in different production frontiers.
We also compute the technical efficiencies of the mutuals relative to the stock frontier and the technical
efficiencies of stocks relative to the mutual frontier, i.e., the cross-frontier efficiencies.  This provides evidence
on our second major null hypothesis, that each group of firms is dominant on average in producing the output
vectors chosen by members of the group.  These results are shown in the columns of Table 2 headed T (y ,x ) m s s
and T (y ,x ), respectively. The stock relative-to-mutual-frontier average scores (T (y ,x )) are consistently s m m m s s
greater than 1, implying that it is not feasible, on average, to replicate stock input-output combinations using
the mutual technology.  Or, in other words, the stock technology dominates mutual technology for producing
the stock firms' output vectors. The mutual technical efficiencies with respect to the stock frontier (T (y ,x )) s m m
are also greater than 1 in 8 of 10 years and on the average, although the mutual-to-stock-frontier scores are
lower than the stock-to-mutual-frontier scores. The implication is that mutual technology weakly dominates
stock technology in producing the mutual output vectors.  20
The significance tests reported in the last two columns of Table 2 show that stock technical efficiencies
relative to the stock frontier are significantly lower than stock efficiencies relative to the mutual frontier,
providing further evidence that the stock technology is dominant in producing the stock output vectors.
Likewise, mutual efficiencies relative to the mutual frontier are consistently and significantly lower than mutual
efficiencies relative to the stock frontier, again suggesting that the mutual technology is dominant in producing
mutual output vectors. 
The cost efficiency results are shown in Table 3.  Statistical testing led to the strong rejection of the null
hypotheses that the stock and mutual frontiers are identical to the pooled frontier.  Consequently, we focus on
the stock and mutual frontier results.  The cost efficiencies for the stock and mutual samples based on their
respective frontiers are shown in the first and second data columns of Table 3, headed C (y ,x ) and C (y ,x ), s s s m m m
respectively. For the sample period as a whole, mutual efficiency averaged 68.2 percent, while stock efficiency
averaged 61.7 percent.   These results imply that mutuals could have reduced their costs by 31.8 percent, on
average, if they had been operating with full efficiency, and that stocks could have reduced their costs by 38.3
percent; but, as above, the results are not correctly interpreted as suggesting that mutuals are more cost efficient
than stocks. 
The cross-frontier cost efficiency comparisons are presented in the columns headed C (y ,x ) (stocks m s s
compared to the mutual frontier) and C(y ,x ) (mutuals compared to the stock frontier). None of the individual s m m
year averages of C (y ,x ) or C (y ,x ) exceeds 1, implying that both stocks and mutuals on average operate m s s s m m 
inside of both cost frontiers. 
The efficiencies of the stocks relative to the mutual frontier (C (y ,x )) are significantly higher than the m s s
efficiencies of the stocks relative to the stock frontier (C (y ,x )) in nine of ten years and overall, paralleling the s s s
technical efficiency results, and implying that the stock cost frontier dominates the mutual frontier for the stock
firms’ output vectors.   However, average cost efficiencies of mutuals relative to the stock frontier (C (y ,x )) s m m
are significantly lower than the efficiencies relative to the mutual frontier (C (y ,x )) during the first four years m m m21
Because there is no natural interpretation of cross-frontier allocative efficiency, we do not have
19
cross-frontier results for this type of efficiency.  Because allocative efficiency is computed as the ratio of cost
efficiency (C) to technical efficiency (T), the rejection of the common frontiers hypothesis for both technical
and cost efficiency implies that allocative efficiency too should be evaluated relative to the stock and mutual
frontiers.
Our estimates of economies of scale indicate that 52 percent of stocks and 61 percent of mutuals
20
are operating at constant returns to scale and that almost all of the remaining firms operate at decreasing
returns to scale (average results for the period as a whole).  Thus, the smaller technological advantage of
mutuals over stocks in producing mutual outputs in comparison to the technological advantage of stocks over
mutuals in producing stock outputs does not appear to be attributable to mutuals’ being less likely to operate
at the optimum scale.  
of the sample period and overall.  Mutual efficiencies relative to the stock frontier are significantly higher than
their efficiencies relative to the mutual frontier in only one year (1988).  These results suggest that the stock
frontier tends to dominate the mutual frontier in terms of cost efficiency.  Thus, even though the mutual
technology tends to be superior to the stock technology on the average, the technological advantage does not
carry through into cost efficiency.  This finding is explored in more detail in the following section.
The difference between the cost results shown in Table 3 and the technical efficiency results shown in
Table 2 primarily reflects allocative efficiency.  Allocative efficiency problems are often interpreted as evidence
of expense preference behavior, i.e., management is over-consuming some inputs and under consuming others.
  Allocative efficiency for stock insurers averaged 70 percent during our sample period, compared to 74 percent
for mutuals, with both comparisons based on group-specific frontiers, suggesting that there is considerable
slippage in efficiency due to the failure to choose the cost-minimizing combination of inputs for both groups
of firms.
19
To summarize, the technical efficiency results presented in this section imply that stocks and mutuals
are using different technologies and that the stock (mutual) technology is superior on average to the mutual
(stock) technology for producing the stock (mutual) firms’ output vectors.  This is consistent with the
managerial discretion hypothesis. However, the stocks’ comparative advantage in producing stock outputs
exceeds the mutuals’ comparative advantage in producing  mutual outputs.  This is as expected if the stock
firms are engaged in more complex operations where technical superiority is important.   Both types of firms
2022
The percentages of stock firms in quartiles 1 through 4, respectively, with F(x,y) < 0 are 71.9%,
21
i i
71.2%, 74.2%, and 70.6%; and the percentages of mutuals in quartiles 1 through 4, respectively with F(y,x) i i
< 0 are 59.6%, 60.1%, 65.7%, and 57%.  Quartile 1 is the smallest size quartile.
experience erosion of their technological advantage due to suboptimal input combinations (allocative
inefficiency).  For stocks, allocative inefficiency reduces but does not eliminate their comparative advantage
in producing stock output combinations.  However, due to the smaller technological advantage of mutuals,
allocative inefficiency leads to dominance of the mutual cost frontier by the stock cost frontier for the mutuals’
output combinations.   Thus, overall, the mutual form of ownership is inferior to the stock form of ownership
in terms of cost minimization.
Cross-Frontier Efficiency: Further Analysis 
In this section we conduct further analysis of the cross-frontier efficiency results using the statistics
F(y,x) and F (y,x) defined in equations (8) and (9).  Recall that if  F(y,x) < 0 (F (y,x) < 0) for output-input i i c i i i i c i i
vector (y ,x), then the stock production (cost) frontier dominates the mutual frontier for that output-input i i
combination, and if F(y,x) > 0 (F (y,x) > 0) , the mutual production (cost) frontier dominates the stock i i c i i
frontier for that input-output combination.  We conduct two additional analyses.  First, we investigate frontier
dominance by size quartile for the firms in the sample to determine whether the same conclusions about frontier
dominance hold for firms in various size categories.  And, second, we conduct a regression analysis to test
predictions of the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses.
The quartile results are presented in Table 4, which shows F(y,x) and F (y,x) for each size group as i i c i i
well as significance tests of the null hypothesis that the averages are equal to zero.  The results in the production
frontiers section of Table 4 confirm our inference that stock technologies are superior in producing stock output
vectors and mutual technologies are superior in producing mutual output vectors.  Stock superiority exceeds
that of mutuals in all size quartiles, and for both organizational forms technical dominance is declining in size.
The results in the cost frontier section of Table 4 show that the average values of F (y,x) are significantly less c i i
than zero for all four size quartiles and both organizational forms.
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Model 3 leads to the same conclusion but requires the evaluation of another set of coefficients.
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The managerial discretion hypothesis predicts that mutuals are likely to have a comparative advantage
in personal lines such as private passenger auto insurance where the need for managerial discretion is low.  In
addition, the maturity hypothesis predicts that mutuals will have a comparative advantage in long-tail lines
because the owner-policyholder conflict is relatively strong in such lines.  To analyze the comparative
advantages of the stock and mutual ownership forms by line of business, we regress F(y,x) and F (y,x), i i c i i
respectively, on a set of independent variables representing organizational form, size, and business mix.  
The regression results are presented in Table 5.  Three models are presented for both the technical and
the cost measures of frontier dominance. The first model (Model 1) includes a dummy variable for the stock
form of ownership (STOCK = 1 if the firm is a stock insurer, 0 otherwise), dummy variables representing the
second, third, and fourth size quartiles (the first quartile is the smallest), interaction terms between the
organizational form and size dummies, and the proportion of total insurance output in the long-tail commercial
lines (LTC%), short-tail personal lines (STP%), and short-tail commercial lines (STC%).  The second model
(Model 2) adds interaction terms between the organizational form variable (STOCK) and the business mix
variables to allow the effects of organizational form to differ by line of business.  The third model (Model 3)
adds interactions between the business mix variables and size, where size is measured by the log of total
insurance output, and between business mix, size, and organizational form.  We use a continuous measure of
size for the interactions to conserve on the number of terms added to the regressions. 
The comparative advantage of the two ownership forms by line of business is seen most clearly in
Model 2 by considering the interactions between the business mix variables (LTC%, STP%, and STC%) and
the dummy variable STOCK in both the technical and cost sections of the table.  The omitted category is
LTP%*STOCK, reflecting the proportion of insurance output in the long-tail personal lines category.  The
22
negative coefficients on the stock organizational form/business mix interaction terms imply that stocks tend to
have a comparative advantage in writing these lines relative to long-tail personal lines in the sense that a24
marginal increase in the proportion of business in these lines tends to shift the stock frontier to the left of the
mutual frontier. This is consistent with the agency theoretic prediction that mutuals tend to do relatively well
in long-tail personal lines. The fact that the coefficient on the long-tail commercial/stock interaction term
(LTC%*STOCK) is lower (in absolute value) than the coefficient on the short-tail commercial/stock interaction
(STC%*STOCK) in the technical dominance version of model 2 is consistent with the argument that the
comparative advantage of stocks is relatively low in long-tail lines (these coefficients are about the same in the
cost version of model 2) .  It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the coefficient on the short-tail personal/stock
interaction (STP%*STOCK) is negative and significant. However, this can be viewed as reinforcing the
inference that the advantage of mutuals is especially significant in long-tail lines.
Productivity Change
The Malmquist indices enable us to measure productivity change for stock and mutual insurers during
our sample period.  Based on the Malmquist analysis, we decompose productivity growth into efficiency
change and technical change components.  Favorable efficiency change is interpreted as evidence of  “catching-
up” to the frontier, while favorable technical change is interpreted as innovation. 
The Malmquist productivity analysis is presented in Table 6.  The results shown are geometric means
of the Malmquist indices and its components for the firms in the sample (see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1996)
based on separate stock and mutual frontiers.  Recall that technical efficiency measures the reciprocal of the
distance of firms from the frontier and that technical efficiency change measures the evolution of this distance
over time.  If the technical efficiency index exceeds 1.0, firms on average have moved closer to the frontier,
and if less than 1.0, firms on average have moved further from the frontier.  The second component of the
Malmquist index, measures movement in the frontier over time (technical change).  If this component of the
index exceeds 1.0, the implication is that technical innovation has occurred, while a value less than 1.0 implies
technical regress.  The Malmquist index itself measures total factor productivity, i.e., a value greater than 1.0
shows productivity growth, while a value less than 1.0 implies productivity decline.25
Table 6 shows the year-to-year technical efficiency change and technical change indices.  For both
stocks and mutuals, technical efficiency and technical change indices fluctuate in a narrow range about 1.0, and
the geometric mean of the year-to-year changes in the Malmquist index and its two components also is close
to 1.0.  Analysis of variance tests reveal virtually no significant differences between stocks and mutuals in
efficiency change, technical change, or total factor productivity growth.  Thus, the technical efficiency and
productivity changes over the period were not dramatic and did not vary significantly by organizational form.
The slight increase in technical change is very likely due to improvements in computer and communications
technology, while the slight decline in efficiency may reflect the difficulty that some firms have had in adapting
to the new technology. These results reinforce our earlier findings that the most significant differences between
stocks and mutuals arise in comparisons of cost efficiency and also reinforces the inference that slippages due
to allocative inefficiency account for the  dominance of the mutuals by the stocks in terms of cost efficiency.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper, we test three agency theoretic hypotheses about stock and mutual organizational forms
in the property-liability insurance industry: (1) The managerial discretion hypothesis, which predicts that stock
insurers have a comparative advantage in lines of insurance where relatively high levels of managerial discretion
are required because the stock ownership form affords superior mechanisms for owners to monitor and control
managers; (2) the maturity hypothesis, which predicts that mutuals have a comparative advantage in lines of
insurance with relatively long payout periods because the owners’ incentive to exploit policyholder interests
is eliminated by merging the owner and policyholder functions in the mutual ownership form; and (3) the
expense preference hypothesis, which predicts that mutuals will be less efficient than stocks because the weaker
mechanisms for controlling owner-manager conflicts in the mutual ownership form permit managers to engage
in excessive consumption of perquisites.  The first two hypotheses imply that the mutual and stock forms of
ownership represent different technologies for producing insurance, where technology is defined as all of the
contractual relationships comprising the firm as well as physical technology choices.26
This paper provides evidence on these hypotheses by estimating the technical and cost efficiency of a
sample of stock and mutual property-liability insurers representing almost 90 percent of industry revenues over
the period 1981-1990.  We first test the hypothesis that the mutual and stock ownership forms represent
different technologies by testing whether pooled technical and cost frontiers are identical to group-specific
frontiers, where mutual efficiencies are measured with mutuals as the reference set and stock efficiencies are
measured with stocks as the reference set.  The hypotheses that the two groups of firms are operating on the
same production and cost frontiers are strongly rejected. This finding supports the agency theoretic arguments
because it implies that the two organizational forms are utilizing distinct technologies.
  We also seek stronger evidence regarding the managerial discretion, maturity, and expense preference
hypotheses by conducting cross-frontier efficiency estimations where each stock (mutual) firm’s efficiency is
measured relative to a reference set consisting of all mutual (stock) insurers. By comparing the cross-frontier
estimates with the group-specific frontier estimates, we can determine which technology (mutual or stock) is
dominant for producing each output vector observed in our sample.  If a specific firm’s efficiency score relative
to its group-specific frontier is greater than its cross-frontier efficiency score, then its group’s technology is
dominated by the technology of the other group in the production of its outputs.  Intuitively, this firm would
have to improve more to achieve full efficiency using the alternative technology than to achieve full efficiency
using its own technology.
The analysis of production frontiers  implies that the mutual frontier dominates the stock frontier for
producing the mutual firms’ output vectors, while the stock frontier dominates the mutual frontier for
producing the stock firms’ output vectors.  This supports the managerial discretion and maturity hypotheses
because it implies that the two organizational forms have been sorted into activities where they have
comparative technological advantages.  Regression analysis reveals that mutuals have a comparative advantage
in writing long-tail personal lines, providing further support for these two hypotheses.
Analysis of cost frontiers, on the other hand, shows that the stock technology tends to dominate the27
mutual technology in terms of cost efficiency not only for stock firms but also for mutuals.  Cost efficiency
encompasses both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, where the latter measures the firm’s success
in employing the cost-minimizing combination of inputs.  Thus, taken together, the production and cost frontier
results suggest that mutuals have developed a superior technology for producing their output vectors but that
this advantage is dissipated for many mutuals because of their failure to minimize costs.  Although the stock
firms’ technological advantage is also eroded due to allocative inefficiency, their greater relative superiority
in technical efficiency allows the stocks’ cost frontier to be dominant for both types of firms.  The dominance
of the stocks in terms of cost efficiency provides support for the expense preference hypothesis.
Our findings suggest a richer interpretation of organizational form in insurance markets than provided
by previous researchers.  The sorting of stock and mutual firms into market segments where they have
comparative advantages and the long-term coexistence of the two types of firms are not necessarily inconsistent
with the mutuals’ being less successful than stocks in minimizing costs.  Search costs (Dahlby and West, 1986),
slow diffusion of information in insurance markets (Berger, Kleindorfer, and Kunreuther, 1989), and private
information (D’Arcy and Doherty, 1991) provide possible explanations for the survival of less efficient
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Figure 130
Stock and Mutual Production Frontiers and Input Distance Function 
Under Constant Returns to Scale
D (y , x ) = 0b/0a > 1 s s s
D (y , x ) = 0b/0c < 1 m s s
D (y , x ) = 0e/0d > 1 m m m
D (y , x ) = 0e/0f < 1 s m m31
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Stock and Mutual Samples
           Sample Means
Variable Definition Pooled Stock Mutual
Number of Firms 417  206  211 
Total Cost 177.2  247.6  * 114.3 
Price of labor input 0.986  0.986  0.986 
Price of materials input 1.218  1.218  1.218 
Price of equity capital input 0.0970 0.1011  * 0.0935 
Price for policyholders' funds 0.0614  0.0613  0.0615 
Labor input 34.3  46.3  * 23.5 
Materials input 76.3  107.6  * 48.3 
Equity capital input 185.1  241.9  * 134.2 
Policyholders' debt capital input 413.0  608.1  * 238.4 
Short tail personal lines output 29.9  29.8  30.0
Short tail commercial output 25.8  41.7  * 11.5 
Long tail personal lines output 68.3  72.9  64.3 
Long tail commercial lines output 46.1  75.1  * 20.2 
Short tail personal lines price 0.645 0.718 * 0.582
Short tail commercial price 0.863 0.801 ** 0.917
Long tail personal lines price 0.646 0.596 * 0.689
Long tail commercial lines price 1.094 1.013 * 1.164
Real invested assets 506.8  701.8  * 332.2 
Return on assets 0.033  0.027  0.038 
Herfindahl index (geographic: by state) 0.589  0.527  * 0.644 
Herfindahl index by line (direct premiums written) 0.440  0.461  ** 0.421 
Premiums-to-surplus ratio 1.846  1.939  * 1.763 
Note:  All output and input quantities are in millions of 1982 dollars.  Output volume is the
present value of real losses (1982 dollars).
*Statistically significant difference between stocks and mutuals at the 1% level.
**Statistically significant difference between stocks and mutuals at the 5% level.32
TABLE 2
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY RESULTS: 1981-1990
Ts(ys,xs)  Ts(ym,xm) vs.
Year Ts(ys,xs) Tm(ym,xm) Tm(ys,xs) Ts(ym,xm) vs. Tm(ys,xs) Tm(ym,xm)
1981  0.8930 * 0.9400 1.3490 * 0.9920 * *
(0.105) (0.073) (0.967) (0.228)
1982  0.8910 * 0.9390 1.3010 * 1.0380 * *
(0.113) (0.071) (0.915) (0.482)
1983  0.8830 ** 0.9050 1.2090 * 1.0220 * *
(0.121) (0.088) (0.756) (0.393)
1984  0.8880 *** 0.9070 1.2180 *** 1.0880 * *
(0.119) (0.099) (0.823) (0.523)
1985  0.8770 * 0.9310 1.3200 * 1.0520 * *
(0.118) (0.083) (0.958) (0.617)
1986  0.8690 * 0.9150 1.3900 * 1.0150 * *
(0.127) (0.091) (1.050) (0.352)
1987  0.8740 * 0.9290 1.3010 * 1.0170 * **
(0.125) (0.077) (0.956) (0.544)
1988  0.8750 * 0.9180 1.2690 * 1.0610 * *
(0.127) (0.085) (0.931) (0.359)
1989  0.8850 *     0.9130 1.1570 1.0660 * *
(0.113) (0.086) (0.713) (0.505)
1990  0.8710 *     0.9210 1.1720 * 0.9980 * *
(0.111) (0.082) (0.689) (0.356)
Mean 0.8804 *     0.9216 1.2669 * 1.0351 * *
(0.1185) (0.0847) (0.8841) (0.4514)
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
NOTE: Tk = Technical Efficiency for frontier (reference set) k
  k = s = stock frontier
  k = m = mutual frontier
Xs, Ys = Input and output for stock firms, respectively
Xm, Ym = Input and output for mutual firms, respectively
*Statistically significant at 1 percent level or better; **statistically significant at the
5 percent level; ***statistically significant at the 10 percent level.33
TABLE 3
COST EFFICIENCY RESULTS: 1981-1990
Cs(ys,xs)  Cs(ym,xm) vs.
Year Cs(ys,xs) Cm(ym,xm) Cm(ys,xs) Cs(ym,xm) vs. Cm(ys,xs) Cm(ym,xm)
1981  0.6265 * 0.7533 0.7871 * 0.6524 * *
(0.1974) (0.1580) (0.3009) (0.1621)
1982  0.6503 * 0.7415 0.7655 * 0.6621 * *
(0.1990) (0.1550) (0.2838) (0.1662)
1983  0.6255 * 0.7088 0.7355 * 0.6606 * *
(0.1989) (0.1655) (0.2813) (0.1781)
1984  0.5907 * 0.6625 0.7163 * 0.6297 * ***
(0.1960) (0.1772) (0.3041) (0.1828)
1985  0.6346 ** 0.6770 0.6882 0.6871 **
(0.2060) (0.1624) (0.2906) (0.1915)
1986  0.6166 * 0.6885 0.7171 *** 0.6726 *
(0.1964) (0.1700) (0.3151) (0.1995)
1987  0.6328 0.6600 0.6956 0.6662 **
(0.2107) (0.1773) (0.3561) (0.2087)
1988  0.6090 0.5968 0.5924 * 0.6826 *
(0.2039) (0.1743) (0.2665) (0.2206)
1989  0.5822 * 0.6659 0.6497 0.6600 **
(0.2186) (0.1882) (0.3072) (0.2233)
1990  0.6077 * 0.6632 0.6589 0.6639 **
(0.2089) (0.1782) (0.2992) (0.2158)
Mean 0.6172 * 0.6815 0.6997 * 0.6638 * *
(0.2043) (0.1758) (0.3054) (0.1963)
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
NOTE: Ck = Cost Efficiency for frontier k
   k = s = stock frontier
   k = m = mutual frontier
ys, xs = Output and input for stock firms, respectively
ym, xm = Output and input for mutual firms, respectively
*Statistically significant at 1 percent level or better; ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level;
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.34
TABLE 4
FRONTIER DIFFERENCES BY SIZE QUARTILE
PRODUCTION FRONTIERS: COST FRONTIERS:
STOCK MUTUAL STOCK MUTUAL
QUARTILE 1 Mean -0.770 0.090 -0.145 -0.023
T-Test -11.976 11.383 -10.702 -3.623
QUARTILE 2 Mean -0.490 0.056 -0.159 -0.059
T-Test -11.305 8.159 -10.662 -7.471
QUARTILE 3 Mean -0.324 0.036 -0.133 -0.063
T-Test 10.208 5.285 -12.597 -9.543
QUARTILE 4 Mean -0.204 0.026 -0.112 -0.034
T-Test -9.174 5.084 -17.275 -6.108
Note:  Upper entries for each quartile and organizational form are averages of
F(yi , xi) (production) and Fc(yi , xi) (cost).  Lower entries are t-tests of the null 
hypothesis that averages are equal to zero.  Quartile 1 = smallest size quartile.35
TABLE 5: REGRESSION ANALYSIS: TECHNICAL AND COST DOMINANCE STATISTICS: 1981-1990
TECHNICAL DOMINANCE: F(y,x) COST DOMINANCE: F (y,x) C
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
YEAR Coeff.  T-ratio Coeff.  T-ratio Coeff.  T-ratio Coeff.  T-ratio Coeff.  T-ratio Coeff.  T-ratio
Constant 0.3595 9.032 0.0826 1.875 0.0596 1.538 0.1304 10.684 0.0701 5.203 0.0487 3.820
DSIZE2 -0.0108 -0.321 -0.0394 -1.173 -0.0393 -1.049 0.0409 -3.963 -0.0613 -5.890 -0.0625 -5.074
DSIZE3 -0.0021 -0.062 -0.0614 -1.768 -0.0742 -1.558 -0.0342 -3.246 -0.0632 -5.880 -0.0770 -4.920
DSIZE4 0.0077 0.220 -0.0545 -1.488 -0.1002 -1.472 -0.0139 -1.292 -0.0502 -4.421 -0.0984 -4.400
STOCK -0.6385 -15.843 -0.0212 -0.331 0.0711 1.045 -0.0341 -2.756 0.1084 5.477 0.0769 3.434
DISZE2*STOCK 0.1635 3.123 0.1136 2.192 -0.0153 -0.267 -0.0378 -2.353 -0.0298 -1.859 -0.0073 -0.386
DSIZE3*STOCK 0.3304 6.292 0.3202 6.139 0.1037 1.483 -0.0103 -0.639 0.0092 0.568 0.0495 2.153
DSIZE4*STOCK 0.4104 7.909 0.3794 7.213 0.0438 0.449 -0.0243 -1.529 -0.0036 -0.219 0.0825 2.576
LTC% -0.1342 -3.555 0.1120 2.238 -0.1957 -0.600 -0.0771 -6.661 0.0072 0.462 -0.2537 -2.365
STP% -0.9417 -14.830 -0.0225 -0.212 -0.9093 -1.280 -0.2997 -15.393 -0.0009 -0.028 -1.0576 -4.529
STC% -0.6190 -14.818 0.0038 0.061 0.4098 0.957 -0.3453 -26.962 -0.2530 -13.067 0.0892 0.633
LTC%*STOCK -0.4430 -5.956 -0.1620 -0.375 -0.1622 -7.044 0.2037 1.432
STP%*STOCK -1.4689 -11.139 -4.5526 -5.301 -0.4657 -11.407 0.0252 0.089
STC%*STOCK -1.0679 -12.943 -2.6371 -5.233 -0.1689 -6.612 0.1619 0.977
LTC%*Ln(Insout) 0.0206 0.986 0.0177 2.574
STP%*Ln(Insout) 0.0578 1.280 0.0668 4.497
STC%*Ln(Insout) -0.0248 -0.908 -0.0223 -2.483
LTC%*Ln(Insout)*STK -0.0138 -0.506 -0.0225 -2.507
STP%*Ln(Insout)*STK 0.2058 3.734 -0.0295 -1.628
STC%*Ln(Insout)*STK 0.1046 3.260 -0.0211 -1.999
0.254 0.291 0.305 0.323 0.344 0.372
2 Adjusted R
Note:  LTC% = proportion of insurance output in long-tail commercial lines; STP% = proportion of insurance output in short-tail personal lines; STC% = proportion of insurance output in
short-tail commercial lines; DSIZE2 = 1 if insurer is in size quartile 2 (quartile 1 = smallest insurers), 0 otherwise; DSIZE3 = 1 if insurer is in size quartile 3, 0 otherwise; DSIZE4 = 1 if insurer is 
is in size quartile four, 0 otherwise; STOCK = STK = 1 if insurer is a stock insurer, 0 otherwise; Insout = total insurance outuput (1982 $, billions).  Year dummies not shown.36
TABLE 6
MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDICES:
EFFICIENCY CHANGE AND TECHNICAL CHANGE
MUTUAL STOCK
Malmquist Efficiency Technical Malmquist Efficiency Technical
Years Index Change Change Index Change Change
81-82 0.9907  0.9983  0.9924  1.0086  0.9981  1.0106 
82-83 0.9712  0.9610  1.0106  1.0001  0.9858  1.0145 
83-84 0.9964  0.9992  0.9972  1.0123  1.0071  1.0052 
84-85 0.9920  1.0300  * 0.9631  ** 0.9176  0.9845  0.9321 
85-86 1.0423  0.9827  1.0606  1.0357  0.9915  1.0445 
86-87 1.0445  1.0170  1.0271  1.0337  1.0062  1.0274 
87-88 0.9932  0.9872  1.0061  ** 1.0249  0.9996  1.0252 
88-89 0.9784  0.9926  0.9857  0.9886  1.0152  0.9737 
89-90 1.0208  1.0090  1.0118  0.9999  0.9832  1.0170 
Geometric
Means: 1.0030  0.9973  1.0057  1.0018  0.9967  1.0051 
***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10%
level.